1982 Lebanon War

1982 Lebanon War Part of Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli-Lebanese conflict and Lebanese civil war
Israeli troops in South Lebanon, June, 1982
Date June – September 1982 Location Southern Lebanon Result Israeli military victory PLO expulsion (1982) Israeli Security Zone and the SLA (1985–2000) South Lebanon conflict (1982–2000) Territorial changes Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon (1982–1985). Syrian de facto occupation of Lebanon (1976–2005). Hezbollah control of southern Lebanon (1980s–2006) and southern Beirut (1980s–present)
Belligerents
Israel SLA LF Phalange	PLO Syria LCP Amal LNRF SSNP
Commanders and leaders
Menachem Begin (Prime Minister) Yitzhak Navon (President) Ariel Sharon (Ministry of Defence) David Ivry (Israeli Air Force) Ze'ev Almog (Israeli Sea Corps) Saad Haddad	Yasser Arafat (PLO leader) Hafez al-Assad (President) Abdul Rauf al-Kasm (Prime Minister) Mustafa Tlass (Minister of Defense) George Hawi Nabih Berri
Strength
Israel: 76,000 troops 800 tanks 1,500 APCs 634 aircraft	Syria: 22,000 troops 352 tanks 300 APCs 450 aircraft 300 major artillery 225 anti-aircraft (100 guns 125 SAM) PLO: 15,000 troops 300 tanks 150 APCs 350+ major artillery 250+ anti-aircraft
Casualties and losses
Killed: 675 Wounded: At least 4,000[1][2]	Syrian & Palestinian (PLO) combatants killed: 9,798 Lebanese killed: 17,825 (estimated)[3]

The 1982 Lebanon War (Hebrew: מלחמת לבנון הראשונה‎, Milhemet Levanon Harishona), (Arabic: الإجتياح‎, Al-ijtiyāḥ, "the invasion"), called Operation Peace for Galilee (Hebrew: מבצע שלום הגליל, or מבצע של"ג Mivtsa Shlom HaGalil or Mivtsa Sheleg‎) by Israel, and later known in Israel as the Lebanon War and First Lebanon War, began on 6 June 1982, when the Israel Defense Forces invaded southern Lebanon. The Government of Israel decided to launch the military operation after the assassination attempt against Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, by the Abu Nidal Organization, a mercenary organization opposed to the Palestine Liberation Organization.^[4]

After attacking the PLO, as well as Syrian, leftist and Muslim Lebanese forces, Israel occupied southern Lebanon and eventually surrounded the PLO and elements of the Syrian army. Surrounded in West Beirut and subjected to heavy bombardment, they negotiated passage from Lebanon with the aid of Special Envoy Philip Habib and the protection of international peacekeepers.

Background

With the establishment of Israel and the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon became home to more than 110,000 Palestinian refugees after fleeing their homes in the former Palestine. After its founding in 1964 and the radicalization among Palestinians, which followed the Six Day War, the PLO became a powerful force, then centered in Jordan. The large influx of Palestinians from Jordan after “Black September” caused an additional demographic imbalance within Lebanese society and its democratic institutions established earlier by the National Pact.^[5][6] By 1975, the refugees numbered more than 300,000 and the PLO in effect created an unofficial state-within-a-state, particularly in Southern Lebanon, which then played an important role in the Lebanese Civil War. Continual violence near the Lebanese border occurred between Israel and the PLO starting from 1968; this had previously peaked during Operation Litani in 1978. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created after the incursion, following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 425 in March 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and help the government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area.^[7] With the completion of Israeli withdrawals from Sinai in March 1982, under the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the Likud-led government of Israel hardened its attitude to the Arab world and became more aggressive.^[8]

As early as 1976, Israel had been assisting Lebanese Christian militias in their sporadic battles against the PLO.^[9] During Operation Litani in 1978, Israel established a security zone in southern Lebanon with mostly Christian inhabitants, in which they began to supply training and arms to Christian militias which would later form the South Lebanese Army^[10]. But Israel's main partner was to be the Maronite Phalange party, whose paramilitary was led by Bashir Gemayel, a rising figure in Lebanese politics^[10] Gemayel's strategy during the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War was to provoke the Syrians into retaliatory attacks on Christians, such that Israel could not ignore. In 1978, Menachem Begin declared that Israel would not allow a genocide of Lebanese Christians, while refusing direct intervention ^[11]. Hundreds of Lebanese militiamen began to train in Israel, at the IDF Staff and Command College. The relationship between Israel and the Maronites began to grow into a political-strategic alliance, and members of the Israeli government like Ariel Sharon began to conceive of a plan to install a pro-Israel Christian government in Lebanon, as it was known that Bashir wanted to remove the PLO and all Palestinian refugees in the country.^[12]

Precursors to war

On 10 July 1981, violence erupted in South Lebanon and Northern Israel. Israel renewed its air strikes after the PLO began shelling northern Israel.^[13] On July 17, the Israel Air Force launched a massive attack on PLO buildings in downtown Beirut. "Perhaps as many as three hundred died, and eight hundred were wounded, the great majority of them civilians."^[14] The Israeli army also heavily targeted PLO positions in south Lebanon without success in suppressing Palestinian rocket launchers and guns. The strategy of the PLO, years later copied by Hezbollah, consisted of widely dispersing artillery and ammunition stockpiles, which largely neutralized the far more powerful Israeli aircraft and artillery. As a result, thousands of Israeli citizens who resided near the Lebanese border headed south. On 24 July 1981, United States envoy Philip Habib brokered a ceasefire badly needed by both parties. Between July 1981 and June 1982, the Lebanese-Israeli border "enjoyed a state of calm unprecedented since 1968."^[15]

US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig filed a report with US President Ronald Reagan on Saturday 30 January 1982 that revealed Secretary Haig's fear that Israel might, at the slightest provocation, start a war against Lebanon.^[16] On 21 April 1982, after a landmine killed an Israeli officer while he was visiting a South Lebanese Army gun emplacement in Taibe, Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force attacked the Palestinian-controlled coastal town of Damour, killing 23 people.^[17] On 9 May, Israeli aircraft again attacked targets in Lebanon. Later that same day, UNIFIL observed the firing of rockets from Palestinian positions in the Tyre region into northern Israel, but none of the projectiles hit an Israeli settlement^[18]--the gunners had been ordered to miss.^[14] Major-General Erskine (Ghana), Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported to the Secretary-General and the Security Council (S/14789, S/15194) that from August 1981 to May 1982, inclusive, there were 2096 violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters (Chomsky, 1999, p. 195; Cobban, 1984, p. 112).^[19] There were more than 240 PLO attacks against Israeli targets, and Israel considered them violations of the ceasefire.^[20] The freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel and UNTSO observers within the enclave remained restricted due to the actions of Amal and the South Lebanon Army under Major Saad Haddad's leadership with the backing of Israeli military forces.^[19]

International reaction

U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim noted: "After several weeks of relative quiet in the area, a new cycle of violence has begun and has, in the past week, steadily intensified." He further stated: "There have been heavy civilian casualties in Lebanon; there have been civilian casualties in Israel as well. I deeply deplore the extensive human suffering caused by these developments." The President of the U.N. Security Council, Ide Oumarou of Niger, expressed "deep concern at the extent of the loss of life and the scale of the destruction caused by the deplorable events that have been taking place for several days in Lebanon".^[21][22] Secretary Haig's critics have accused him of "greenlighting" the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Haig denies this and says he urged restraint.^[23] The American reaction was that they would not apply any undue pressure on Israel to quit Lebanon as the Israeli presence in Lebanon may prove to be a catalyst for the disparate groups of Lebanon to make common cause against both Syrian and Israeli forces. Haig's analysis, which Ronald Reagan agreed with, was that this uniting of Lebanese groups would allow President Elias Sarkis to reform the Lebanese central Government and give the Palestinian refugees Lebanese citizenship.^[24]

Israel's Casus Belli

One of the reasons for the invasion, according to Sheldon L. Richman was "the discrediting and destruction of the PLO, which, by June 1982, had observed its cease-fire with Israel for about a year and had been pursuing a diplomatic strategy."^[25] Although the PLO had observed the ceasefire, Israel continued looking for the "internationally recognized provocation" that Secretary of State Alexander Haig said would be necessary to obtain American support for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.^[26] On 3 June 1982 an anti-Arafat splinter group which was not a part of the PLO and was headed by Abu Nidal paralyzed Israeli diplomat Shlomo Argov in an assassination attempt in London. Prime Minister Menachem Begin had been informed by Israeli intelligence that the PLO was not involved in the attack on Argov, but withheld this information from his Cabinet.^[27] Sami Moubayed would write in 2008 that Rafael Eitan, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, responded to the aforementioned information by saying: "Abu Nidal, Abu Shmidal. I don't know, we need to screw the PLO."^[28] In late 1981, Begin compared Arafat to Adolf Hitler, telling a high-ranking Israeli general at the Waldorf-Astoria, "I want to see Arafat in his Bunker!".^[29]

Opposing forces

The 1982 Lebanon War first was a conventional war up to and including when the PLO were expelled from Beirut. The war was limited by both Israel and Syria because they were determined to isolate the fighting, not allowing it to turn into an all-out war. Israeli forces were numerically superior, allowing Israel to maintain both the initiative and an element of surprise. The Syrian Army fielded six divisions and 500 aircraft, while Israel had eleven tank divisions and eleven infantry brigades, plus 600 aircraft.

PLO

Palestinian forces continued to grow in Lebanon with full-time military personnel numbering around 15,000, although only 6,000 of these, including 4,500 regulars, were deployed in the south. They were armed with 60 aging tanks, many of which were no longer mobile, and 100 to 200 pieces of artillery . According to Israeli analysts Schiff and Ya'ari (1984), the PLO more than tripled its artillery from 80 cannons and rocket launchers in July 1981 to 250 in June 1982.^[30] The same authors also refer to Israeli intelligence estimates of the number of PLO fighters in southern Lebanon of 6,000 as "divided into three concentrations; about 1,500 south of the Litani River in the so-called Iron Triangle (between the villages of Kana, Dir Amas, and Juya), Tyre, and its surrounding refugee camps; another 2,500 of the Kastel Brigade in three districts between the Litani and a line running from Sidon to northeast of Nabatiye; and a third large concentration of about 1,500–2,000 men of the Karameh Brigade in the east, on the slopes of Mount Hermon".^[31]

PLO primary forces consisted of three conventional brigades each of 2,000 to 2,500 men and seven artillery battalions.^[32] Each brigade was composed of contingents of the many PLO factions. The Yarmouk Brigade was stationed along the coastal strip while the Kastel Brigade was in the south. The Karameh Brigade was stationaed on the eastern slopes of Mount Hermon in the area called Fatahland.

The PLO had around 15,000 - 18,000 fighters (of whom about 5,000-6,000 were alleged to be foreign mercenaries from such countries as Libya, Iraq, India, Sri Lanka, Chad and Mozambique [1]) and they were disposed as follows^[33]:

• 6,000 in the Beirut, Ba'abda and Damour area,
• 1,500 in Sidon,
• 1,000 between Sidon and Tyre,
• 1,500 in Tyre,
• 1,000 deployed from Nabatiyeh to Beaufort Castle,
• 2,000 in Fatahland, and
• around 1,000 in the UNIFIL Zone.

Heavy weapons consisted of about 60 T34, T54 and T55 tanks, most of which were dug in as pillboxes, up to 250 130mm and 155 mm artillery, many BM21 Katyusha multiple rocket launchers plus heavy mortars. (Sayigh, 1999, p. 524)

Non-PLO Palestinians

Palestinian groups in the radical Rejectionist Front fought on the Muslim-leftist side. While others, such as Saiqa, the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) were essentially mercenary armies for foreign governments (Syria, Iraq, and Libya, respectively)^[34]

Syria

The Syrian Army deployed over 30,000 troops in Lebanon.^{[34] [35]}

The largest concentration was in the Bekaa Valley where the 1st Armoured Division consisting of the 58th Mechanised and the 76th and 91st Armoured Brigades. The 62nd Independent Armored Brigade and ten commando battalions were also assigned to the division. Syria deployed around 400 tanks in the Bekaa Valley. 19 Surface to Air missile batteries, including SA6's, were also deployed in the Bekaa Valley.

In Beirut and the Shouf Mountains were the 85th Infantry Brigade, PLA, As-Sa'iqa and 20 commando battalions. Syria deployed around 200 tanks in this area. Their primary mission was to protect the Beirut-Damascus Highway, which was Syria's primary supply line in the region.^[33]

Israel

IDF forces totaled 78,000 men, 1,240 tanks and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers. IDF troops were deployed in five divisions and two reinforced brigade-size units. The IDF maintained additional forces on the Golan Heights as an area reserve.^[33] IDF forces were divided into three main axis of advances called sectors^[33][36]:

• Coastal Sector, from Rosh Hanikra north to Tyre, Sidon, Damour and Beirut. Forces included IDF Division 91 with three brigades including the 211th and the Golani Brigade. The 35 Paratroop Brigade and the Na'hal 50th Paratroop Battalion were attached to the division as needed. The Israeli Navy provided naval interdiction, shore gunfire support and landed a mixed brigade from Division 96 at the mouth of the Awali River near Sidon. Israeli Naval commandos had landed there previously.^[33][36]
• Central Sector, from Beaufort Castle to Nabatiyeh, Jezzine was the main objective and then on to Sidon to link up with the coastal forces. IDF forces included the Divisions 36 and 162.^[33]
• Eastern Sector, from Rachaiya and Hasbaiya thru the Bekaa Valley around Lake Qaraoun. IDF forces included Divisions 90 and 252, the Vardi Force and the Special Maneuver Force which was composed of two brigades of Infantry and paratroops who were trained for anti-tank operations. These forces were primarily used to contain the Syrians with orders not to initiate combat against them.^[33][36]

Lebanon

Lebanese Army APC, Beirut 1982

Lebanese Army - By 1982 the Lebanese Army had largely disintegrated leaving a primarily Christian force of about 10,000 men in five brigades, the 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, plus some smaller independent units. This rump force was officially neutral and followed the orders of the Lebanese government, but provided tacit and active support to the Lebanese Front.^[34]

A Lebanese national army unit of 1,350 was under the operational control of the UNIFIL commander, HQ located at Arzun with sub-units attached to UNIFIL Battalions.^[19][33]

Other Paramilitary forces in Lebanon

• South Lebanon Army, founded in 1979 the SLA fought against both the PLO and Hezbollah. The SLA was composed of Christians, Shias and Druze from the areas that it controlled but the officers were mostly Christians.

• The Christian Lebanese Front, sometimes called the Kufur Front, combined Lebanese Front forces totaled about 30,000 fighting men and women. These forces were mostly Phalangist, though there were some men from Saad Haddad's "Free Lebanon forces".^[37]

• The Muslim Lebanese National Movement combined Lebanese Front forces totaled about 30,000 fighting men and women.

• Druze Initially neutral but turned against the CLF when the new government attempted to force their way into Druze territory. The Druze militia consisted of 10,000 to 20,000 men and boys.^[38]

• Shiite organizations
  • Amal Movement the militia wing of the Movement of the Disinherited, a Shi'a political movement. Initially neutral. The Shia Amal guerrillas had been ordered by their leaders not to fight and to surrender their weapons if necessary.^[38]
• Hezbollah the other Shiite militia ostensibly formed during the invasion and backed by Iran.

UNIFIL

No information available at the present time.

Timeline

An aerial view of the stadium used as an ammunition supply site for the PLO, after Israeli airstrikes in 1982.

Invasion

On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces under direction of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon invaded southern Lebanon in "Operation Peace for Galilee".

Course of the fighting

Israel's publicly stated objective was to push PLO forces back 40 kilometres (25 mi) to the north. Israeli forces pushed in from Southern Lebanon in a three-pronged offensive. They captured strategic positions throughout the country, with some of the fiercest fighting taking place at Beaufort Castle, Nabatieh, and the Syrian-held town of Jezzine. The Israeli Air Force launched Operation Mole Cricket 19, with the Israeli air force claiming it won a dramatic victory over Syrian aircraft, by saying it downed 29 Syrian planes and also destroyed 17 Syrian anti-aircraft missile batteries, and claiming no air to air no losses of its own, however the Israeli lost at least an A-4 to a SAM on June 6, 1982^[39] and its pilot became a POW^[40]. Syria however did acknowledge they lost 16 aircraft on June 6, 1982. Some sources also say Israel lost a Kfir on June 6, 1982^[41] Further more Israeli aircraft also pounded PLO targets in Beirut, and Israeli gunboats shelled the coastal roads in order to cut PLO supply lines. Israeli forces fought their way into the Syrian-held town of Sultan Yacoub. They became surrounded, but managed to break out. Sultan Yacoub was one of the few objectives the IDF decisively failed to take in the war. The Israelis swept through Lebanon, pushing towards Beirut. To cut off any PLO retreat routes, the Israeli Navy landed a force of tanks, armored vehicles, and paratroopers north of Sidon.^[42] soon reached Beirut but were determined to drive the PLO from southern Lebanon.^[43] Tyre and Sidon (major cities in South Lebanon, still within the 40-kilometre (25 mi) limit) were heavily damaged, and the Lebanese capital Beirut was shelled by Israeli artillery, and bombed by Israeli aircraft for ten weeks, killing both PLO members and civilians. Israeli troops captured Beirut Airport and several southern suburbs of the city in heavy fighting.

The Israeli Air Force claims it shot down 86 Syrian aircraft^[44], with no air combat losses of its own. This was the largest combat of the jet age with 150 fighters from both sides.^[45][46] however the PLO and Syrians claimed to have shot down Israeli aircraft, Syria claimed 19 Israeli aircraft knock out on 6 June 1982^[47] and the PLO at least 3 airplanes and one helicopter the same day ^[48][49][50] as ABC news reported, Israel at least lost 3 airplanes and 5 helicopters from 5 June 1982 to 24 June 1982^[51][52]. Most of the Russian historians say Syria lost from 6 June 1982 to June 11, 1982, 6 MiG-23MFs, 4 MiG-23MS, 26 MiG-21Bis, 14 MiG-23BNs, 7 Su-22 and 18 Gazelle helicopters, but of these, 12 aircraft and 8 Helicopters were lost ground fire and 3 Su-22 were lost in combat but not to enemy fire^[53] In the same way many Russian historical sources^{[54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62]} claim Israel lost a similar number of aircraft, some sources put that number in the range of 60 Israeli aircraft downed^[63][64][65], nevertheless they agree with the Israeli claims that Syria at least lost 42 aircraft in June 1982. The Israeli Air Force also performed ground attacks, notably destroying the majority of Syrian anti-aircraft batteries stationed in Lebanon. AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships were used widely against Syrian armor and fortifications but the Syrians and PLO managed two shoot down at least two AH-1s according to Israeli sources or around 7 by some Russian sources^[66] The Syrians in the other hand lost French built Gazelle helicopters^[67][68]. The IAF Cobras destroyed dozens of Syrian Armored fighting vehicles, including some of the modern Soviet T-72 main battle tanks^[69], however Israel did lose tanks too to Syrian Helicopters, MiG-23BNs, Su-22s and Syrian and PLO ground forces. among them at least 6 Merkava tanks^[70][71]. Israeli SAMs, F-16s and F-15s shot down Su-22 and MiG-23BNs^[72][73][74] that during air strikes destroyed Israeli tanks^[75].

An agreement was reached later in 1982, and American, French, and Italian peacekeepers, known as the Multinational Force in Lebanon, sent more than 14,000 PLO combatants out of the country in August and September. About 6,500 Fatah fighters relocated from Beirut to Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, both North and South Yemen, Greece, and Tunisia—the latter of which became the new PLO headquarters.^[76] Philip Habib, Ronald Reagan's envoy to Lebanon, provided an understanding (i.e., assurance) to the PLO that the Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps would not be harmed. However, the United States Marines left West Beirut two weeks before the end of their official mandate following the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing.

On 14 September 1982, Bachir Gemayel, the newly elected President of Lebanon, was assassinated by Habib Shartouni of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.^[77] Israeli forces occupied West Beirut the next day, in violation of the Habib agreement. At that time, the Lebanese Christian Militia, also known as the Phalangists, were allied with Israel.^[78] The Israeli command authorized the entrance of a force of approximately 150 Phalangist fighters' into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, claiming there was a remaining force of approximately "2000 PLO terrorists" in the camps.^[78] The result was the Sabra and Shatila massacre in which at least 800 civilians were slaughtered by the Phalangists, who themselves suffered only two casualties. Meanwhile, Israeli troops surrounded the camps with tanks and checkpoints, monitoring entrances and exits.^[78] Further Israeli investigation by the Kahan Commission of Inquiry found that Ariel Sharon bears "personal responsibility" for failing to prevent the massacre, and for failing to act once he learned that a massacre had started, and recommended that he be removed as Defense Minister and that he never hold a position in any future Israeli government. Sharon initially ignored the call to resign, but after the death of an anti-war protester following an anti-war protest, he did resign as Israel's Defense Minister, however, he remained in Begin's cabinet as a Minister without portfolio.

Outcome of the war

Casualties

It is estimated that around 17,825 Lebanese were killed during the first year of the war, with differing estimates of the proportion of civilians killed. This number of civilian casualties is not the total number of civilian casualties from 1982-2000. Beirut newspaper An Nahar estimated that 5,515 people, both military and civilian, were killed in the Beirut area alone during the conflict, while 9,797 Syrian soldiers, PLO fighters, and other forces aligned with the PLO, as well as 2,513 civilians were killed outside of the Beirut area.^[79] Approximately 675 Israeli soldiers were killed.^[80]

Samuel Katz and Lee E Russell in their book Armies in Lebanon 1982-84^[81] puts the casualties as follows:

• Israel - 368 dead and 2,383 wounded
• PLO - 1,500 dead and an unknown amount wounded plus around 8,000 captured
• Syria - 1,200 dead and around 3,000 wounded plus 296 captured
• Lebanon - civilians 17, 825 and around 30,000 wounded.
• Foreigners - 1800 foreigners from 26 countries on five continents, allegedly training in the Ein el Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon, were captured.

They also state that the extensive PLO political and military infrastructure in Lebanon, which had taken 15 years to build, had been destroyed.

Lebanese estimates, compiled from International Red Cross sources and police and hospital surveys, calculated that 17,825 Lebanese had died and over 30,000 had been wounded.^[82]

The security buffer zone

Map showing power balance in Lebanon, 1983: Green - controlled by Syria, purple - controlled by Christian groups, yellow - controlled by Israel, blue - controlled by the United Nations

In September 1982, the PLO withdrew most of its forces from Lebanon. With U.S. assistance, Israel and Lebanon reached an accord in May 1983 that set the stage to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon while letting them patrol a "security zone" together with the Lebanese Army.

The instruments of ratification were never exchanged, however, and in March 1984, under pressure from Syria, Lebanon canceled the agreement.

In January 1985, Israel started to withdraw most of its troops, leaving a small residual Israeli force and an Israeli-supported militia, the South Lebanon Army in southern Lebanon in a "security zone", which Israel considered a necessary buffer against attacks on its northern territory. The Israeli withdrawal to the security zone ended in June 1985.

Political results

In the voting in the Knesset on the war, only Hadash opposed the war (and even submitted a no-confidence motion against the Israeli government). Hadash Knesset member Meir Vilner said in the Knesset plenary session that: "The government is leading Israel to an abyss. It is doing something that in the course of time might lead to crying for generations." In response, they were condemned, and calls were heard, among others from the editor of Yediot Ahronoth, to prosecute them for treason. Left-wing Knesset members, including Shulamit Aloni and Yossi Sarid, were absent from the plenary for the vote. Even the Labour faction voted in support. By mid January 1983 Rabin was saying that the Israeli attempt to impose a peace agreement on Lebanon by the use of force was a "mistake" based upon an "illusion".^[83]

Syria backed the anti-Arafat PLO forces of Abu Musa in the Beka valley from May 1983. When Arafat castigated the Syrian government for blocking PLO supplies in June 1983, the Syrian government declared Arafat a persona non grata on 24 June 1983.^[84]

With the withdrawal of the PLO leadership from Tripoli in December 1983 there was an Egyptian-PLO rapprochement, this was found to be encouraging by the Reagan administration but was condemned by the Israeli government.^[85]

But heavy Israeli casualties, alleged disinformation of Israeli government leaders and the Israeli public by Israeli military and political advocates of the campaign, and lack of clear goals led to increasing disquiet among Israelis. This culminated in a large protest rally in Tel Aviv, organized by the Peace Now movement, following the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre. Organizers claimed 400,000 people participated in the rally, and it became known as the "400,000 rally". Other estimates put the figure much lower.^[86]

In 2000, when Ehud Barak was Israeli Prime Minister, Israel finally withdrew from the security zone to behind the Blue Line. Lebanon and Hezbollah continue to claim a small area called Shebaa Farms as Lebanese territory, but Israel insists that it is captured Syrian territory with the same status as the Golan Heights. The United Nations has not determined the final status of Shebaa Farms but has determined that Israel has complied with UNSC resolution 425. The UN Secretary-General had concluded that, as of 16 June 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978, bringing closure to the 1982 invasion as far as the UN was concerned.^[87]

Investigation into violation of International Law

See also: Sabra and Shatila massacre, section MacBride commission report

In 1982, an international commission investigated into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon. Chairman was Seán MacBride, the other members were Richard Falk, Kader Asmal, Brian Bercusson, Géraud de la Pradelle, and Stefan Wild. The commission's report^[88] concluded that "the government of Israel has committed acts of aggression contrary to international law", that the government of Israel had no valid reasons under international law for its invasion of Lebanon, and that the Israeli authorities or forces were involved directly or indirectly in the massacres at Sabra and Shatila.

Consequences

The 1982 Lebanon War had a number of consequences:

• From the standpoint of the Israeli Military, the invasion was a success, removing PLO presence from Southern Lebanon and destroying its infrastructure, as well as increasing deterrence on other Arab anti-Israeli militant organizations. The Syrian military was weakened by combat losses, especially in the air.
• The failure of the larger Israeli objectives of resolving the conflict in Lebanon with a peace treaty^[89], of securing its hold on the West Bank by destroying effective Palestinian resistance,^[90].
• The Israeli-Maronite alliance was shattered, and Sharon's goal of installing a pro-Israel Christian government in Beirut was not accomplished.^[91] 850,000 Christians would emigrate during the Civil War, most of them permanently.^[92]
• Increased erosion of the consensus against criticizing the military in Israeli public opinion and disillusionment with its leadership, a process which is commonly held to be rooted in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.
• The invasion that also targeted many Shiite Lebanese, has brought about the switching of sides of Amal Movement, which used to fight against the PLO prior to the invasion.
• The invasion is popularly held to be the major catalyst for the creation of the Iranian and Syrian supported Hezbollah organization, which by 1991 was the sole armed militia in Lebanon not supported by Israel and by 2000 had completely replaced the vanquished PLO in Southern Lebanon.
• The Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction estimated the cost of the damage from the invasion at 7,622,774,000 Lebanese pounds, equivalent to US$2 billion at the time.^[93]
• Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden said in a videotape released on the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential elections that he was inspired to attack the buildings of the United States by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon in which towers and buildings in Beirut were destroyed in the siege of the capital.^[94]
• The withdrawal of the IDF back to South Lebanon in the summer of 1983, led to one of the bloodiest phases of the Lebanese war, where the Christian Militia (the Lebanese Forces) was left alone to defend the "Mountain" area which comprised the Aley and Chouf districts against a coalition of Druze PSP, Palestinian PLO, Syrian Army, Lebanese Communist, and Syrian Social National Party. The result was catastrophic on the civilian population from both sides (more than 5,000 killed from both sides). The war ended after the Christian forces and civilians withdrew to the town of Deir el Kamar where they were besieged for 3 months before all hostilities ceased and they were transported to East Beirut.

See also

• Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• Sabra and Shatila massacre
• Palestine Liberation Army
• Lebanese civil war
• UN Security Council Resolution 425
• Siege of Beirut
• Golan Heights Law
• 2006 Lebanon War
• Operation Litani
• Waltz with Bashir

Notes

 This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the Library of Congress Country Studies.

References

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• Ed. Sela, Avraham"Arab-Israeli Conflict." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. . New York: Continuum, 2002. ISBN 0826414133 and ISBN 9780826414137

External links

• Lebanese civil war 1982 Full of Pictures and Information
• A detailed account of 1982 Lebanon War – From Ariel Sharon's Biography
• 1978 Israel - Lebanon Conflict by Ynetnews
• Lebanon War at the Jewish Virtual Library
• Ex-spymaster: First Lebanon War was Mossad success, despite Sabra and Chatila By Nachik Navot, Haaretz